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was correct in characterizing its standard of culpability as one
"repeatedly held to be sufficient in the context of enforcement pro-
ceedings seeking equitable or prophylactic relief," 77 it may have
been misleading in characterizing the standard as "negligence" since
the concept of scienter has been expanded by the Second Circuit in
previous decisions to include - the "negligent" action of Schiffman in
Spectrum.
RANDOLPH H. ELKINS
Antitrust Law—Class Actions—Tolling of Federal Statutes of
Limitations—American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.'—On
June 19, 1964, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California found American Pipe & Construction Com-
pany and five other steel and concrete pipe companies 2
 guilty of
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3
 Four days later, the United
States filed civil complaints against the same six companies which,
as amended, sought to recover damages and to restrain further
violations of sections of the Sherman, 4 Claytons and False Claims6
Acts.? On May 24, 1968, a negotiated "final judgment" was entered
against the companies. 8
On May 13, 1969, the State of Utah instituted a civil antitrust
suit against the same defendant pipe companies, 9 seeking treble
damages for violations of section 1 - of the Sherman Act. The com-
plaint, which was based on the same events as those involved in the
government's suits, was brought in the United States District Court
reckless disregard of available information and probably culpable under the strictest scienter
standard,
77 489 F,2d at 541.
414 U.S. 538 (1974).
• The other five companies indicted were United Concrete Pipe Corp., Kaiser Steel
Corp., United States Steel Corp., United States Industries, and Smith-Scott, Inc. Maricopa
County v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp, 77, 79 (D. Ariz. 1969).
3
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The indictments alleged that the six companies had combined
and conspired to restrain interstate trade by submitting collusive and rigged bids for the sale
of pipe and had divided the business thus obtained among themselves. 414 U.S. at 540.
• 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
5
 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1970).
• 31 U,S.C. § 231 (1970).
' 303 F. Supp. at 80.
8
 Id. In Maricopa County, the district court determined that although five of the
defendant pipe companies settled their suits with the government on Dec. 8, 1967, and a
"partial final judgment" was entered which was, for all practical purposes, a final judgment
against all the defendants except American Pipe, the conspiracy linking the companies
together required that the "final judgment" as to all of the defendants not be entered until the
case of the last defendant, American Pipe, was terminated on May 24, 1968. Id, at 87.
9
 Utah v, American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal, 1969). In addition to
the six companies involved in the government's suits, Utah also named Utah Concrete Pipe
Co, and W.R. White Co. as defendants in the case. Id.
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for the District of Utah. Utah brought the action on its own behalf
and as representative of a class of approximately 800 members
consisting of other western states that had not filed- similar actions
and numerous public entities within the State of Utah." Since the
final judgment in the government's civil suit had been entered on
May 24, 1968," the institution of Utah's action on May 13, 1969
was timely by eleven days, pursuant to section 5(b) of the Clayton
Act, 12 which suspends the running of the four year antitrust statute
of limitations (section 4B) 13 during the pendency of a federal suit
and for one year thereafter."
The case was transferred to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California for assignment to Judge Martin
Pence, who had handled all of the previous litigation within the
Ninth Circuit arising from the alleged pipe companies' conspiracy."
There, the defendants moved, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 for an order that the suit not be
'° Id. at 18-20.
" See note 8 supra.
12 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970) provides in pertinent part;
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to
prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws . the running of
the statute of limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said
laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: Pro-
vided, however, That whenever the running of the statute of limitations in respect of
a cause of action . . . is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of
action shall be forever barred unless commenced either within the period of suspen-
sion or within four years after the cause of action accrued.
13 15 U,S.C. § 15b (1970) provides in pertinent part; "Any action to enforce any cause of
action . . . shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of
action accrued."
14 Cases construing § 5(b) of the Clayton Act since its amendment to current form in
1955 have interpreted it to mean that a plaintiff must commence a suit either (a) within four
years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action, or (b) within the year following the
termination of the government's suit, without regard to whether four years have passed since
cause of action accrued. See, e.g., Solinski v. General Elec. Co., 149 F. Supp. 784, 786
(D.N.J. 1957).
13 In re Concrete Pipe, 303 F. Supp. 507 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1969).
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class ii'so numerous
that joinder of all members is•impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: . . .
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirabil-
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maintained in the form of a class action.", On December 4, 1969,
Judge Pence, relying On his experience with the previous pipe com-
pany cases, grahted the motion. He predicated his decision on the
failure of Utah's class to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(1) prerequisite of a
sufficiently numerous class.'s The class action was terminated as of
May 13, 1969, the date of the filing of the complaint. 19
On December 12, 1969, eight days after Judge Pence's denial of
class action status, approximately sixty of the public entities in
Utah's purported class sought leave to intervene as plaintiffs ih
Utah's private action, either as of right under Federal Rule 24(a)(2) 2°
ity or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
(c) Determination by . Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An
order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the•best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exdusion;
and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision/
(b) (I) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in
subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be members of the class. . . .
•	 (d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule ,
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: '(1) determining the course of
proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in
the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that'notice be
given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of
members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to
intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3)
imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that
the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of
absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar
procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and
may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time. , . .
" Utah's action would appear to have been a Rule 23(b)(3) class suit and as such it
would have had to satisfy the prerequisites in Rule 23(a) and the requirements enumerated in
Rule 23(b)(3), quoted in note 16 supra.
11 49 F.R.D. at 21.
19 Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 473 F.2d 580, 582 (9th Cir. 1973).
2° Fed. R, Civ. P. 24(a) provides in pertinent part:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2)
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or by permission under Rule 24(b)(2). 21 On March 20, 1970, Judge
Pence denied the motions, concluding that both of the Clayton Act's
limitation periods 22 had run against the petitioners, and barred
intervention. 23 Judge Pence specifically rejected the contention that
the commencement of the class action on May -13, 1969 retailed
section 5(b) for the purported class members so as to permit them to
relate their claims back to that date and thereby retain eleven days
in which to intervene prior to the running of the statutory period.
To permit intervention in this manner, Judge Pence declared, would
abridge the defendants' substantive right to interpose the bar of
limitations provided in section 5(b). 24
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the denial of intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2),
but, with one dissent, reversed the district court's denial of permis-
sive intervention. 25 The court reasoned that the initiation of Utah's
action did toll the limitation provision in section 5(b), with eleven
days yet to run, for all of the members of the class, until that time
when they were ejected from the suit by Judge Pence's denial of
class action status. 26
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" to consider important
questions concerning the proper interaction between federal statutes
of limitations and Rule 23 class actions in the federal courts. In an
opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, the Court unanimously affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals28 and HELD: the timely com-
mencement of a suit denominated a class action tolls the applicable
federal statute of limitations for every asserted member of the class,
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the ... transaction which is the
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest . . . .
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) provides in pertinent part:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2)
when an applicant's claim . . .,and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common. . . . In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.
22 See notes 12-14 supra.
23 Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 102-08 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
24 Id.
15 473 F.2d at 582-84. After Judge Pence had denied intervention, the petitioners
amended their complaint to remove allegations of conspiracy for the four years immediately
preceding the suit's commencement in order to permit the order denying intervention to
become final and thus appealable. Id. at 582 n.l. See also 50 F.R.D. at 110.
The Ninth Circuit handed down an opinion on Dec. 11, 1972 which reversed the order
denying intervention. This opinion emphasized that the members of Utah's class had refrained
from bringing individual suits because of their reliance on their membership in Utah's suit.
Recognizing that the record did not substantiate the assumption of reliance, the court
withdrew its first opinion and issued the decision which is discussed in the text of this note.
Brief for Petitioners at 9-10, American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners].
26 473 F.2d at 583.84.
27 American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 411 U.S. 963 (1973).
21 Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion, 414 U.S. at 561.
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regardless of whether the suit is later denied class action status after
the statutory period has elapsed. 29 Emphasizing the policy of
efficiency and economy of litigation inherent in Rule 23, the Court
declared that this standard applied even to those class members wild
Were not aware of the suit's existence. 3 ° Finally, the Court specified
that the running of the statutory period was suspended only until
the class action was denied maintenance. Thus, since Utah had
initiated its action with eleven days left to run, the motions by the
putative class members for intervention, which were filed only eight
days after Judge Pence's denial of class status, were found to be
timely. 3
American Pipe' & Construction Co. v. Utah was a case of first
impression for the Supreme Court. Prior to- American Pipe, the
Court had never addressed itself to the threshold issue of the impact
of the commencement of a maintainable class action upon a federal
statute of limitations, 32 much less the effect of a suit which, after the
limitation period had run, was "stripped of its character as a class
action." 33 Hence American Pipe provided the Court with a vehicle
by which to render a complete exposition of the principles and rules
governing the interaction within the federal sphere of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Congressionally enacted
statutes of limitations.
At the outset, this note will survey certain of the policy consid-
erations underlying class actions and federal statutes bf limitations.
With that background the Supreme Court's opinion in American
Pipe will be examined—first as to the Court's ruling regarding the
tolling of the statute of limitations by the initiation of a maintainable
class action, and then as to its holding that the timely commence-
ment of a class suit, which is denied class action status after the
statutory period has run, tolls the limitation provision for all as-
serted members of the class. With reference to the latter, it will be
submitted that the breadth of the Court's holding in American Pipe
may be unwarranted in light of the inherent potential for purported
class members to derive an unjust and unexpected windfall at the
expense of the defendant's rights. Finally, an alternative and less
expansive formula to govern the interaction of Rule 23 and federal
statutes of limitations will be proposed and discussed.
The preliminary issue in determining the proper effect of the
timely institution of a class action upon the Clayton Act's limitation
period must be whether this federal statute of limitations may ever
be tolled judicially. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
29
 Id. at 552-53.
39
 Id. at 550-52.
31 Id. at 560-61.
32
 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 22. See also Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of
Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivision (d), 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 577, 584
(1969).
33
 Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 023, 39 F.R.D. 98, 104 (1966). 	 .
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promulgated pursuant to the authority granted in enabling
legislation 34
 which included the caveat that "[sluch rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights . . . ."35 Accord-
ingly, class action proceedings under Federal Rule 23 may never
result in a diminution of any of a litigant's substantive rights. 36
Thus, in American Pipe, Judge Pence premised his denial of leave to
intervene on a belief that the tolling of section 5(b) by a Federal
Rule 23 proceeding, which was determined not to be maintainable,
would be an abridgement of the defendant pipe companies' substan-
tive rights. 37
 He reasoned that Congress had created innovative
substantive rights for plaintiffs in the antitrust statutes, replete with
treble damages, cost of suit including reasonable attorney's fees," a
prima facie evidentiary rule 39 and a suspension of the limitation
provision." Yet accompanying these plaintiffs' rights was a solitary
obligation: the suit had to be brought within the prescribed limita-
tion period. Moreover, an integral part of the congressional antitrust
scheme was the right of the defendant ."to interpose the bar of
limitations to attempted tolling of § 5(b) by Rule 23 . . . ”41
Consequently, Judge Pence concluded sections 4B and 5(b) provided
the defendants with a substantive right of repose which could not be
modified by a federal rule of procedure. 42
However, the persuasive reasoning of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in an earlier case, Kansas City, Missouri v. Federal
Pacific Electric Co.," casts certain doubts over Judge Pence's con-
clusions. There, the court pointed out that section 4B, which was
created solely for the avowed purpose of providing a uniform limita-
tion period," was not added until forty-one years after the Clayton
Act was initially enacted; therefore it could not be part of an overall
34
 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
33 Id.
36 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1014 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, but not
rev'd, — U.S. —, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
" 50 F.R.D. at 108.
3°
 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
39 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
40
 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970). For the pertinent language of this section, see note 12 supra.
4 ' 50 F.R.D. at 108.
42 Id .
43 31Q F.2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1962), 373 U.S. 914 (1963). The
court in Kansas City was concerned with the problem of whether the four year limitation
period in § 4B could be tolled in a manner other than that provided in § 5(b). Specifically the
question before the court was whether § 4B could be tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment. Judge Pence, in rejecting the Eighth Circuit's approach, noted that Kansas City
involved tolling 14B due to fraudulent concealment whereas American Pipe concerned tolling
§ 5(b) by virtue of Federal Rule 23. 50 F.R.D. at 107 n.22. Yet in his opinion, Judge Pence
stated that both §§ 4B and 5(b) were integral parts of the legislative scheme. Id. at 108. See
text at notes 41-42 supra. Moreover, it should be noted that both Kansas City and American
Pipe raised the preliminary question of whether the federal statute of limitations provided in
the Clayton Act can be judicially tolled.
44
 S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2328, 2331.
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legislative scheme providing the antitrust defendant with a substan-
tive right. 45
 The fact that section 5(b) was also amended in 1955 to
bestow upon the plaintiff an additional year after the United States
suit has terminated in which to bring his private suit would seem to
substantiate the position taken in Kansas City that sections 4B and
5(b) do not combine to create a defendant's substantive right. The
court in Kansas City further suggested that perhaps the
substantive/procedural dichotomy was not the crucial determinant
at all, but rather that congressional intent was the controlling factor
in tolling the Clayton Act's limitation period.46
The Supreme Court, in American Pipe, specifically rejected
Judge Pence's line of reasoning, and by implication adopted that of
the court in Kansas City: "The proper test is not whether a time
limitation is 'substantive' or 'procedural,' but whether tolling the
limitation in a given context is consonant with the legislative
scheme."47 - The Court noted that the substantive/procedural
dichotomy is only determinative in those cases where the issue
presented is whether to apply federal or state law in proceedings
held in the federal courts by virtue of diversity or maritime
jurisdiction." The Court then distinguished the present case, which
turned on the question of whether judicial power exists to toll a
federal statute of limitations, from the conflict of laws cases. This
same distinction had been drawn in Burnett v. New York Central
R.R., 49
 where the question was whether the congressionally created
three year statute of limitations in the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA) 5 ° could be judicially tolled. There the Supreme Court
concluded:
Classification of such a provision as 'substantive' rather
than 'procedural' does not determine whether or under
what circumstances the limitation period may be extended.
.. [T]he basic inquiry is whether congressional purpose is
effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in given
circumstances. 5 t
Hence in American Pipe, the Supreme Court was following its
own precedent when it rejected the substantive/procedural rationale
underlying the district court's opinion. The Court attempted to settle
the issue definitively:
45 310 F.2d at 282.
46
 Id. at 283.
47
 414 U.S. at 557-58.
4° Id. at 557. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); The Harris-
burg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). •
49. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
5° 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1970). Section 6 of the FELA provides in pertinent part "No
action, shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the
day the cause of action accrued." 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
51
 380 U.S. at 426-27.
1016
CASE NOTES
[T]he mere fact that a federal statute providing for a sub-
stantive liability also sets a time limitation upon the in-
stitution of suit does not restrict the power of the federal
courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under
certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative
purpose. 52
Having clarified that the principal inquiry is whether federal
statutes of limitations may be tolled "consonant with the legislative
scheme,"53 it is necessary to determine the congressional purpose in
enacting limitation provisions. In a 1944 case, 54 the Supreme Court
had discussed the purposes of limitation statutes in general:
Statutes of limitation . . . are designed to promote justice
by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.
The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust
not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the
period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
them. 55
In essence, then, limitation provisions seek to assist defendants by
delineating time restrictions upon legal liability and by condemning
all claims not raised within this prescribed period as stale and
unenforceable.
Yet, as the Supreme Court noted in Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 56
 there
would appear to be one further congressional purpose inherent in
the antitrust limitation provisions. The Supreme Court there
cautioned that the 1914 congressional proceedings revealed "an al-
most complete absence of any discussion on the tolling problem,"57
but observed that "{w]hatever ambiguities may exist in the legisla-
tive history of these provisions .. . it is plain that in section 5(b)
Congress meant to assist private litigants in utilizing any benefits
they might cull from government antitrust actions." 58
 The inclusion
in the Clayton Act, as originally passed, of a provision for tolling the
applicable statute of limitations during the pendency of a suit
brought by the government would seem to support this view of the
legislative purpose in section 5(b)..Moreover, the Senate report on
52 414 U.S. at 559.
33
 Id. at 557-58.
14
 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342
(1944).
53
 Id, at 348-49.
56
 381 U.S. 311 (1965). In Minnesota Mining the Supreme Court decided that a Federal
Trade Commission hearing was a "civil suit" within the meaning of § 5(b). Id. at 321-22.
57
 Id. at 320.
5s Id. at 317.
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the 1955 amendment to section 5(b), which provided antitrust plain-
tiffs with one additional year during which the statute of limitations
would be tolled, indicated that a primary motivation for the addi-
tional tolling year was to ensure that plaintiffs would be able to
enjoy the full benefit of the governinent's case in preparing their
individual suits. 59
 Thus it would appear that, while creating a right
of repose for antitrust defendants, Congress, through section 5(b),
indiCated that under the proper circumstances a tolling of the limita-
tion provision should transcend the policy of repose. Hence, it can
be posited that judicial tolling of this federal statute of limitations is
assuredly not inconsistent with the effectuation of congressional
purpose.
Of course, this concern for whether the judicial tolling of the
limitation period would be consistent with the legislative intent must
be applied to the particular circumstances presented in the indi-
vidual case. In Burnett, the Supreme Court stated that the purpose
and policies underlying the limitation provision and the remedial
scheme utilized by the plaintiff were proper factors for
examination." There, after such an analysis, the Court found that
the timely commencement of a suit in a state court, under the
FELA, which was dismissed for improper venue after the limitation
provision had run its course, tolled the federal statute of limitations
so as to permit the plaintiff to refile his claim in the federal courts. 61
The Court reasoned that the timely commencement of the action
was proof that plaintiff had not slept on his rights and also had
served to provide the defendant with notice of the suit against him,
thus fulfilling two major purposes behind the statute of
limitations. 62
Further, federal courts have held congressionally enacted stat-
utes of limitations to be tolled where the defendant's misrepresenta-
tions induced the plaintiff not to commence his action in a timely
fashion, 63
 where participation in a war impeded the timely initiation
of the suit," and in cases of fraudulent concealment. 65
In moving to an examination of American Pipe, the focus must
center on the particular circumstances. presented in the case, princi-
pally the distinctive remedial scheme—a Rule 23 class action
—utilized by the plaintiffs. Rule 23, as originally enacted, permitted
what came to be called a "spurious" class action when there was "a
common question affecting the several rights" of a class which was
59
 S. Rep. No. 619, supra note 44, at 2332.
60 '380 U.S. at 427.
61
 Id. at 435-36.
62 Id. at 429-30.
63
 See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959); Scarborough v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1950).
" See, e.g., Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1947).
65
 See, e.g., Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 342 (1874); Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
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seeking a common relief. 66 The rule, however, was silent as to the
means of ascertaining the composition of the class as well as to the
binding quality of the judgment. 67 In practice the "spurious" suit
served as nothing more than a permissive joinder device," with the
attendant potential for "one-way intervention."69 The controversy
that arose concerning this inherently unfair procedure led to the
development of two discrepant views among the federal judiciary
with regard to the proper effect of a timely institution of a bona fide
class action, i.e., one which is ultimately maintained, upon the right
of potential class members to intervene after the applicable statute
of limitations had run." A majority of the federal courts, relying on
the representative character of a class action, ruled that the filing of
the' suit tolled the limitation period and thus permitted joinder or
intervention by the potential members of the class. 71 But some
courts, perceiving the "spurious" suit as essentially a joinder device,
required each individual party seeking to intervene to satisfy the
applicable statutory provision as of the time he sought to enter the
class. 72 The Supreme Court never addressed itself to this inconsis-
tency in the federal courts' interpretation of Federal Rule 23. 73
The 1966 amendments to Rule 23, which were designed to
solve the "one-way intervention" problem, deleted the "spurious"
class suit provision and replaced it with Rule 23(b)(3). 74 Further, a
mechanism was inserted by which determinations could be made as
66
 Rule 23(a)(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States, 308 U.S. 645, 689 (1939).
67
 American Pipe, 414 U,S: at 545-46.
68 313 J. Moore, Federal Practice 11 23.10[1], at 23-2601 (2d ed. 1974); Ford, Federal Rule
23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 501, 503 (1969);
Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 515,
516 (1969).
.69
 American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 547. See also Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 105-06 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Adv. Comm. Note], and cases cited
therein. "One-way intervention" refers to the practice of potential class members of a "spuri-
ous" class action to delay their decision on whether to intervene until the trial had progressed
to the point where it could be decided with reasonable certainty whether intervention would
best serve their individual interests; at times this delay was permitted to extend until after the
verdict. This procedure enabled the class member to share in a favorable verdict, while also
retaining the ability to avoid a binding unfavorable judgment, 414 U.S. at 547.
" It was uniformly agreed that if the party seeking to join the suit was already barred by
the limitations provision at the time the class action was instituted, the suit would not serve to
revive his claims. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965). See Comment, Class Actions Under New Rule 23 and Federal
Statutes of Limitation: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 Vill. L. Rev. 370, 373 (1968).
71 See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 340 F,2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965); Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F,2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), petition for cert. dismissed, 371
U.S. 801 (1962); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
72 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v.
Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941); P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Newman, 25 F.R.D. 264
(S.D.N.V. 1960); Athos v. Day, 161 F. Sum), 916 (D. Colo. 1958).
73 See 414 U.S. at 550.
74
 For the text of Rule 23(b)(3); see note 16 supra.
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to the identity of the members of the class, who then would be
bound by the judgment in the case. 75 These measures were thought
by most commentators to resolve the issue dividing the courts with
reference to the appropriate effect of . the filing of a maintainable
class suit in favor of a tolling of the statute of limitations for all of
the potential members of the class. 76
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in American Pipe, there
were four federal cases which involved the issue of the proper
impact of the timely filing of a class action, under amended Rule
23(b)(3), upon the applicable limitation provision as to the absent
class members. 77
 While each of the four declared that the timely
commencement of a valid class action tolled the statutory period for
all of the asserted members, in only one, Minnesota v. United States
Steel Corp., 78
 did a court, in reaching its decision, balance the
policy considerations inherent in Rule 23 and federal statutes of
limitations.
Minnesota was an antitrust case, and after finding the class
action maintainable, District Judge Neville faced the question of
whether the commencement of the class suit had tolled the Clayton
Act statute of limitations for all of the class members. 79 Judge
Neville reviewed the dearth of definitive legislative history on the
question of tolling, 80
 the elimination of the "one-way intervention"
problems, 81
 as well as the fact that the institution of the suit ensured
that the defendants were forewarned of the claims against them, 82
and concluded that the commencement of the class action, which
was maintained under Rule 23, tolled the Clayton Act statute of
limitations for all of the asserted members of the class."
Thus, although the question of whether the timely filing of an
75 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)-(3). See note 16 supra.
78 See, e.g., 3B J. Moore, supra note 68, 23.90[3], at 23-1651 to -1653; C. Wright, law
of Federal Courts § 72, at 316 (2d ed. 1970); 2 W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 568, at 112-13 (Supp. 1970); Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning
Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 40 (1967); Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23
and. the Development of Amended Rule 23, 32 Antitrust LI 254, 262-63 (1966); Donelan,
The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Class Suit Under New Rule 23, as Seen by the
Treble Damage Plaintiff, 32 Antitrust L.J. 264, 265-66 (1966). But see Comment, supra note
70, at 383-84,
Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969);
Hellerstein v. Mather, 360 F. Supp. 473 (D. Colo. 1973); Minnesota v. United States Steel
Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co.,
43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
7 B 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
79 Id. at 573 -74. The court in Minnesota was actually concerned with the propriety of
tolling the four year provision set out in § 4B of the Clayton Act. For the language of § 4B,
see note 13 supra. Judge Neville speaks of § 5(b) in obvious reference to the second paragraph
of that section. For the language of § 5(b), see note 12 supra. The language in the second
paragraph of § 5(b) is a reference, of course, to the provision in § 4B.
gg Id. at 575. See text at note 57 supra.
81 Id. at 574-75. See note 69 supra and text at notes 74-75 supra,
g2 Id, at 575-76.
83
 Id. at 565, 573.
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authentic class action, under amended Rule 23, tolls a federal
statutory period was one of first impression for the Supreme Court
when it granted certiorari in American Pipe, the Court had the
benefit of the views expressed in four lower court opinions, the near
unanimous thoughts of the commentators and the earlier rulings in
the "spurious" class cases.
The Supreme Court, following the approach' it had outlined in
Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 84 examined the policy considera-
tions behind Rule 23 and the statute of limitations. Mr. Justice
Stewart, noting the consequences of the amendments to Rule 23,
declared that a federal class action is no longer merely a joinder
device, but is a representative suit designed to remove the necessity
for each potential class member to file papers with the court to
assure his participation in the suit, as would be necessary if the
timely filing of a bona fide class action did not toll the limitation
provision for the class members. 85 The Court found that the policies
of "efficiency and economy of litigation," 86 which underlie Rule 23,
militate for a tolling of the statute of limitations on behalf of the
entire class upon timely initiation of a class ,action.
The Supreme Court then considered whether the policies be-
hind the formulation of statutes of, limitations pressed for an oppo-
site conclusion. The Court noted that the commencement of Utah's
suit provided 'notice to the defendant companies, within the statu-
tory period, of the complaints against which they would be com-
pelled to defend as well as the "number and generic identities of the
potential plaintiffs . . . ."87 Moreover, as the suit was brought
within the limitation period set out in section 5(b), Utah's claims, by
definition, were not stale and time-barred. Hence the Court con-
cluded that the tolling of the applicable federal statute of limitations
by the commencement of a valid class action was "consistent both
with the procedures of Rule 23 and with the proper function of the
limitations statute."'"
It is submitted that there , should be little dispute as to the
wisdom of the Supreme Court's decision that the timely commence-
ment of a maintainable class action tolls a federal statute of limita-
tions for the entire membership of the class, Class actions are
essentially a device by which legal controversies dominated by ques-
tions and claims held in common by a cumbersome number of
parties may be most efficiently and fairly adjudicated. 89 The suit by
its very nature is of a representative character; the litigation of a few
renders binding judgments for the consenting many who comprise
the class. Accordingly, logic dictates that when the suit is initiated
84
 380 U.S. 424 (1965). See text at note 60 supra.
115 414 U.S. at 550.
86
 Id, at 553.
87
 Id. at 555.
88 Id.
89
 For the language of Rule 23, see note 16 supra.
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by the moving parties, it is also commenced for the absentee class,
as subsequently determined. 90
Moreover, the purpose behind limitation provisions is not
thwarted by such a result. The very fact that the complaint was
filed in a timely fashion indicates that.the plaintiffs have not slept.on
their rights within the meaning of repose. Statutes of limitations
define the time at which claims become legally extinguished, and if a
suit is brought within the prescribed period the statute's avowed
purpose has been satisfied. Thus, on weighing the policy considera-
tions, it appears only reasonable that the timely commencement of a
bona fide class action tolls the applicable federal statute of limita-
tions for each and every member of the class being represented.
Hence in American Pipe the Supreme Court definitively re-
solved the issue of the proper interaction within the federal sphere of
a maintainable class action, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the applicable congressionally created statute
of limitations. The rationales and rulings of the four federal courts
who had previously dealt with this issue in light of the 1966
amendments," as well as the majority of those opinions pertaining
to tolling in "spuribus" class suits, 92 were supported by the highest
court of the land. However, the case in which the Supreme Court
chose to enunciate the principles and rules governing the interaction
of class actions and limitation provisions93 presented one further
9° See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), quoted in note 16 supra.
91
 See note 77 supra and text at notes 77-83 supra.
92
 See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
93
 An interesting ancillary question to the Supreme Court's ruling in American Pipe,
especially in view of the significande of the decision in this case of first impression, is the
propriety of the grant of certiorari. Court of Appeals Judge Kilkenny, in dissenting from the
Ninth Circuit's holding in the case, declared his belief that Judge Pence had merely exercised
judicial discretion in denying intervention. 473 F.2d at 584 (dissenting opinion). The rule has
long been that "in the absence of an abuse of discretion, no•appeal lies from an order denying
leave to intervene when intervention is a permissive matter within the discretion of the court."
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R,R., 331 U.S. 519, 524 (1947). Accord,
Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 142 (1944); Stadin v.
Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court stated that Judge
Pence had not weighed the considerations of intervention, but had concluded as a matter of
law that the petitioners were barred by the running of the statute of limitations. 414 U.S. at -
560, Yet a reading Of Judge Pence's order denying intervention shows he did at least consider
the issue of prejudice, which is arguably a Matter of discretion. Further, if the judge had
denied permissive intervention solely because the limitation period had run, as the Supreme
Court said he did, it is perplexing that he did not deny intervention as Of right for the same
reason. See 50 F.R.D. at 102 and notes 20-21 supra.
One possible solution to this enigma is that the Supreme Court found in American Pipe a
unique opportunity to clarify the entire field of issues pertaining to the interaction of Rule 23
and federal statutory limitations. This one case:presented questions as to the effect of the
institution of a bona fide class action upon the applicable statute of limitations as well as the
effect of a suit denied class action status. Further, the case posed the issue of the significance
of the "substantive/procedural" dichotomy in this area of federal law. Finally, the case
presented an occasion for the Court to express its views on the merits of reliance playing a
dominant role in the determination of a purported class member's rights after a class action
has been denied. In light of these considerations, the Court's grant of certiorari can be
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question: did the timely filing of a class action toll the statutory
period for all of the class members if, after the limitation had
expired, the suit was found, under Rule 23, not to be maintainable
as a class action? This appendant issue was also a question of first
impression for the Court. The Advisory Committee on the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 recognized this problem but did not purport
to propose a solution. The Committee's Notes indicate that after a
class action has been denied, whether putative class members
should "be permitted to claim . . . the benefit of the date of the
commencement of the action for purposes of the statute of-limita-
tions [is] to be decided by reference to the laws governing . . .
limitations as they apply in particular .contexts." 94 Further, the
question appears to have been infrequently litigated at all levels of
the federal judiciary. 95 -
The Ninth Circuit's reversal of Judge, Pence in American Pipe
placed considerable emphasis on the particular facts of the case. The
court interpreted the district court's ruling to be simply an expres-
sion of preference for the action to be litigated via joinder of the
parties rather than by class treatment. Accordingly, the court of
appeals found that the class members and their claims were safely
before the court and protected against the bar of section 5(b). 96 Thus
the Ninth Circuit ruled that under the particular facts presented the
initiation of the class action, within the statutory period, tolled the
statute of limitations as to all of the class members so that when the
suit was later denied class status, the class members were not barred
from intervening. 97
However, the Ninth Circuit's opinion, unlike that of any other
federal court considering this issue, did not mention the possibility
of requiring class members to prove their reliance on the class action
as a prerequisite to gaining the benefit of a tolled statute." District
court opinions prior to American Pipe had declared that members of
a group denied class status for the purpose of a purported class
action would be entitled to intervene, or initiate their own suit, with
the advantage of a tolled statutory period, only if they could show
that they had refrained from bringing a timely individual action due
interpreted as the result of a desire to seize the immediate opportunity to clarify an entire area
of federal practice with one case.
" Adv. Comm. Note, supra note 69, at 104.
95 One of the few cases to confront the issue squarely seems to be Hellerstein v. Mather,
360 F. Stipp. 473 (D. Colo. 1973), where a class member of an earlier abortive class action
sought to file his own suit claiming that the institution of the earlier action had tolled the
statutory period in his behalf. The court held that the applicable statute of limitations was
tolled by the earlier suit as to every member of the putative class even though the suit was
subsequently denied class action status. The ruling in Hellerstein, however, was based solely
upon the authority of the Ninth Circuit's ruling,in American Pipe. Id. at 475. As such it is of
little value to this discussion.
96
 473 F.2d at 583-84.
97 Id. at 584.
96
 The Ninth Circuit's initial opinion in American Pipe, however, was almost solely
premised on the rationale of reliance exhibited by the class members. See note 25 supra.
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to their good faith reliance on the class action brought on their
behalf. 99
 This conclusion was premised on the rationale that only
those parties who had actually and knowingly placed their
confidence in the class action to protect their interests "should not be
penalized for failing to file parallel individual actions or motions to
intervene.y , too
Moreover, in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American
Brass Co., 101 the district court, by way of dictum, had suggested yet
a more stringent rule. There, the court stated that only in those
cases where class action status had been denied for "considerations
of judicial housekeeping" should the class members even be permit-
ted to attempt to show that their reliance on the existence of the
class action was sufficient to warrant the statute of limitations being
tolled. 102
 It was this more stringent position which appears to have
been the one most favored by the commentators. 1 °3
Thus, when the Supreme Court confronted the question in
American Pipe, it had the benefit of varying views from the lower
federal courts. However, in determining the • rule which would
henceforth regulate the rights of class members of a.suit denied class
action status, the Court did not avail itself of any of these opinions.
Instead, the Court chose merely to apply its own rule that the timely
commencement of a class action tolls the federal limitation provision
for all the members of the class. The Court noted that where the
case concerns the initiation of a maintainable class action, the ques-
tion is the right of the absentees to participate as members of the
class, and where the suit has been denied class action status, the
question is the right of the absentees to participate via
intervention. 104
 The Court perceived no substantial difference in the
two situations, as in each the inquiry remained whether the institu-
tion of a suit denominated a class action tolled the applicable statute
of limitations so as to permit participation by the purported class
members. The previously discussed balancing of the policy consid-
erations inherent in Rule 23 and statutory provisions 105
 led the
Court to but one conclusion: "[T]he commencement of the original
class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members
99
 Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Accord,
Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 394 n.13 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Rogers v. Coburn
Fin. Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417, 419 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
'°° Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
'°' 43 F.R.D 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Philadelphia Electric was the first case after the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 to declare that the initiation of a valid class action tolls the applicable
statute of limitations for all of the members of the class. Id. at 460.
102 Id. at 461.
103
 See, e.g., 3B J. Moore, supra note 68,
	 23.90[3], at 23-1653 to -1654; C. Wright,
supra note 76, at 316; Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of
Subdivision (d), 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 577, 584-86 (1969).
104
 414 U.S. at 552.
103
 See text at notes 84-88 supra.
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of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court
has found the suit inappropriate for class action status." 106
Thus the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding,
but in so doing the Court adopted a far more expansive approach to
the issue than that employed by the court of appeals or any of the
district courts which had discussed the question. Viewing the prob-
lem as essentially identical to the issue presented by the timely
institution of a bona fide class action, the Supreme Court considered
the representative nature of class suits and determined that the same
standards applied to those who did not rely on the proceedings as to
those who did so rely."' The federal limitation provision was tolled,
therefore, for each and every .member of the class regardless of
whether the beneficiary was even aware of the proceeding's exis-
tence. The reliance distinction drawn by the district courts prior to
American Pipe" was apparently thought to be inconsistent with
the policies underlying Federal Rule 23. The Supreme Court con-
cluded:
We are convinced that the rule most consistent with fed-
eral class action procedure must be that the commence-
ment of a class action suspends the applicable statute of
limitations as to all asserted members of the class who
would have been parties had the suit been permitted to
continue as a class action.'° 9
The breadth of this ruling is striking. While logic dictates that
the timely commencement of a bona fide class action should toll the
applicable statute of limitations for every eligible class member,
reason and a sense of fair play reject the conclusion that the timely
filing of a suit which is denied class status should also suspend the
statute for each and every asserted class member.
The principal rationales cited by the Supreme Court for tolling
the limitation provision for the entire membership of a maintainable
class suit are the unique representative nature of the form of
action"° and the policy of "litigative efficiency and economy" inher-
ent in the procedure."' But it is submitted that neither rationale
retains its full persuasive force when a suit has been "stripped of its
character as a class action."' 12
 A non-class action is by definition not
a representative suit: the moving parties are appearing only for
themselves and the rights they are protecting are solely their own.
Similarly, the policies of efficiency and economy of litigation under-
106
 414 U.S. at 553.
107
 Id. at 550-52.
'")* See text at notes 99-102 supra.
1 ° 9 414 U.S. at 554.
110
 Id. at 550. See text at notes 85, 90 supra.
'" Id. at 556. See text at note 86 supra.
112
 Adv, Comm, Note, supra note 69, at 104.
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lying class action proceedings would seem to be of less consequence
when that very mode of proceedings has been specifically declared
to be inappropriate for the case.
To the contrary, it is suggested that the only validly persuasive
justification for permitting a purported class member of a suit filed
before, but denied class action status after, the statutory period has
elapsed to benefit from a tolled statute of limitations is to prevent
converting Rule 23 into a trap for the unwary. 113
 It would be an
assault. upon the basic principles of fairness and justice to bar the
party who was fully cognizant of his own cause of action but
intentionally forbore from proceeding individually because of a be-
lief that his inclusion as an asserted member of the class would
adequately protect his rights. To deny this class member the right to
intervene would be penalizing his faithful •observance of the proce-
dures_ prescribed in Rule 23. Moreover, this absentee's inactivity,
which was based on his reliance on participation in the class action,
had the ultimate effect upon the defendant of providing additional
time in which to prepare a defense against the forthcoming suit.
However, this reasoning is inapplicable when the absentee class
member was unaware of the class action proceedings. The class
member who is unaware of the action being brought on his behalf
cannot possibly have relied on the suit's existence to protect his
rights, nor was his lack of individual action against the defendant
even remotely related to an observance of class action procedures.'"
Thus, the policies underlying Rule 23 should have little bearing on
this situation, for, the nonrelying class member never perceived
himself as being represented.
Moreover, if it were not for the class action, the nonrelying
member's cause of action would have been legally extinguished by
virtue of the running of the applicable statute of limitations. Hence,
to toll the statutory provision for this class member would be to
grant him an unexpected windfall. But beyond this unwarranted
benefit to the absentee, the suspension of the limitation period
would also directly injure the' defendant, who has "the right to be
free of stale claims " 115 and indeed would have been relieved of this
absentee's claim if!
 it were not fol. the fortuitous inclusion by the
moving party of the absentee's name in his complaint. Yet, the
Supreme Court's ruling in American Pipe included this unaware
" See York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944).
114
 As one commentator has pointed out:
One can only speculate on the percentage of each class who failed to bring an action
because of their reliance on the original suit as compared to those who carelessly or
otherwise let the statutory period expire and are taking the advantage of an unex-
pected windfall.
Comment, 35 Fordham L. Rev. 295, 308 (1966).




class member as a beneficiary of the tolled statutory period resulting
from the timely filing of a class action. It is contended that the
tolling rules established in AmeriCan Pipe will serve to revive
numerous slumbering claims to the great detriment of defendants
named in defective class action suits.
This concern is magnified upon the realization that the Court's
holding in American Pipe would not seem to be limited to the issues
presented by the precise facts of the case. The Court's constant
utilization, while discussing the merits of tolling, of generic ter-
minology with regard to limitation provisions, as opposed to specific
references to section 5(b), 116 might well indicate an intention that
the rules enunciated in American Pipe be applicable to all federal
statutes of limitations, and not merely to section 5(b). Further, the
Court stated:
[Alt least where class action status has been denied solely
because of failure to demonstrate that "the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,"
the commencement of the original class suit tolls the run-
ning of the statute for all purported members of the class
117
This language leads to speculation that suits denied class action
status for failure to meet other of the prerequisites provided in Rule
23(a) 118 may also be deemed to toll the applicable statutory period
for all of the class members. 119
Recognizing the possible detrimental impact on defendants
which might result from this expansive ruling, Mr. Justice Black-
mun, in his concurring opinion in American Pipe, commented that
the Court's decision that the timely commencement of a class action
tolls the applicable limitation provision for all of the purported class
members does not remove or diminish the necessity for those class
members to satisfy the requirements in Rule 24 12° in order to obtain
leave to intervene. 121 However, with the benefit of a tolled statute,
it would seem the class member desiring to file a claim against the
defendant would have the choice of seeking intervention under Rule
16 414 U.S. at 545-60. See also Eisen v. Carlisle Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 n.13
(1974).
117 Id. at 552-53 (emphasis added), quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
I' For the language of Rule 23(a), see note 16 supra.
119 This belief is only heightened by the Court's unqualified statement:
The rule most consistent with federal class action procedure must be that the
commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to
all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been
permitted to continue as a class action.
414 U.S. at 554.
120 For the text of Rule 24, see notes 20-21 supra.
111 414 U.S. at 561-62 (concurring opinion).
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24, or, alternatively, of initiating his own action against the defen-
dant in the alloted time, thereby by-passing the intervention
requirements. ' 22
Thus, it is submitted that the breadth of the Supreme Court's
decision in American Pipe is unwarranted in view of the inherent
potentialities for many of the asserted class members to derive an
unexpected and quite unjust windfall at the great expense of the
defendant's rights. In view of the fact that a dominant concern
inherent in class action procedure is fairness, 12' the courts' primary
interest should be with protecting the individual rights of all of the
parties to the suit, including the defendant. Class members who
have refrained from individual action due to a good faith reliance on
the class suit should not be penalized, but neither should a defen-
dant be compelled to face claims which in reality were revitalized by
an abortive class action proceeding. It is recommended that the
proper treatment of this issue is provided by the reliance procedure
suggested by a majority of lower federal courts under amended Rule
23 prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in American Pipe. 124 The
only method which can serve this duality of interest, consistent with
principles of fairness, is to permit those class members who in
reliance on the class suit forbore individual action to proceed with
the applicable limitation provision tolled as of the date the class suit
was commenced, but to free the defendant from the claims of those
who did not so rely, if the untolled statute of limitations would now
bar their claims.
Further, the practicalities of such a scheme do not appear to be
unmanageable. After a suit has been determined not to be maintain-
able as a class action, those purported class members who refrained
from individual action in reliance on the suit would simply be
required to present a showing of such reliance in order to be granted
the benefit of a tolled statute. While this may entail slightly less
economy of litigation, it is contended that where a suit is denied
class status, the goal of litigative efficiency must defer to the princi-
ples of fairness.
Moreover, satisfactory proof of reliance could be assured by the
mere filing of a notice certifying the party's 'awareness of and re-
liance on the class action. An affirmative action requirement similar
to this proposed notice has been imposed by courts under Rule 23
with regard to intent to prove damages. 125 Such notice will ensure
the class member's right to proceed under a tolled statutory period
and will also serve better to inform the defendant of the scope of
122
 See Hellerstein v. Mather, 360 F. Supp. 473 (D• Colo. 1973).
123
 Cf. Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 543, 552 (1973). See text at note 89 supra.
124
 See note 99 supra.
123
 E.g. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968);
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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impending litigation confronting him if the class action is found to
be defective and is not permitted to continue. 128
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's decision in American Pipe
& Construction Co. v. Utah that the timely commencement of a
bona fide class action, under Rule 23 of the Federal Miles of Civil
Procedure, tolls the applicable federal statute of limitations as to
every member of the represented class is endorsed as a wise and
prudent resolution of a long unanswered and "important question
affecting the administration of justice in the federal courts."I 27 This
ruling is consonant with the "effectuation of the purposes of litiga-
tive efficiency and economy" 128 which underlie Rule 23, the intrinsic
representative nature of class actions, and the principles of basic
fairness which should pervade every judicial proceeding. However,
it is submitted that the Court's application of the aforementioned
rule to cases where class action status is denied after the expiration
of the applicable limitation period is encumbered with inherent
injustice. The tolling of a federal statute of limitations for each and
every asserted member of the class, under these circumstances,
carries the attendant potential for purported class members to derive
an unjust benefit to the severe and unwarranted detriment of the
defendant. It is urged that the Supreme Court avail itself of the next
opportunity to reconsider its ruling on this issue in American Pipe,
for when a suit is stripped of its character as a class action the
dominant concern should be always with the basic principles of
fairness, thus ensuring that the individual rights of all the parties to
the original suit are not diminished.
KENNETH S. PRINCE
Labor Law—Interaction of Title VII and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act—Union Exclusivity and Individual Rights—Western Addi-
tion Community Organization v. NLRB.'—The Emporium (the
Company), a large San Francisco department store, was both inte-
grated and unionized. A collective bargaining agreement was in
effect which vested exclusive bargaining power in the hands of the
union. This agreement included an. anti-discrimination clause, pro-
vided for referral of grievances to the adjustment board, and al-
lowed either party to insist on binding arbitration if the adjustment
board failed to reach a settlement within one week. 2
126 The authority for such a notice requirement may be found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(5),
and also, at least arguably, in Rule 23(d)(2), quoted in note 16 supra.
127
 414 U.S. at 545.
In Id. at 556.
485 F.2d 917, 83 L.R.R.M. 2738 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3468
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-830),
2
 485 F.2d at 919-20, 83 L. R.R.M. at 2739.
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